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Re-evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation 
Effect and the Overcritical Juror 
 
Abstract 
Eyewitnesses are susceptible to recollecting that they experienced an event in a way 
that is consistent with false information provided to them after the event. The effect is 
commonly called the misinformation effect. Because jurors tend to find eyewitness 
testimony compelling and persuasive, it is argued that jurors are likely to give 
inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony, judging it to be reliable when it is 
not. It is argued that jurors should be informed about psychological findings on the 
misinformation effect, to ensure that they lower the credence that they give to 
eyewitness testimony to reflect the unreliability of human memory that is 
demonstrated by the effect. Here I present a new argument, the overcritical juror 
argument, to support the conclusion that eyewitnesses are likely to make 
inappropriate credence assignments to eyewitness testimony. Whereas previous 
authors have argued that jurors will tend to give too much credence to eyewitness 
testimony, I identify circumstances in which jurors will give too little credence to 
some pieces of testimony. In my view jurors should be informed by psychological 
findings relating to the misinformation effect to ensure that they do not lower the 
credence that they give to eyewitness testimony when they should not.  
 
1. Introduction  
Testimony from eyewitnesses can be decisive in criminal trials.i However, over the 
last hundred years psychologists have gathered a vast body of evidence that is 
frequently taken to show that the testimony is unreliable (Howe and Knott 2015). The 
claim that eyewitness testimony is unreliable has been based in part on research 
showing that people are susceptible to what is commonly called the misinformation 
effect.ii In the misinformation effect, a person recollects that they experienced an 
event in a way that is consistent with false information provided to them after the 
event. It is widely accepted that people tend to find eyewitness testimony compelling 
and persuasive (e.g. Brigham and Bothwell 1983), but psychological results on the 
misinformation effect suggest that the memories that are the source of eyewitness 
testimony can be distorted, suggesting that people should approach the testimony with 
more scepticism than they are predisposed to. It has been argued that jurors and others 
working with the legal system should be introduced to psychological findings 
illustrating the misinformation effect to ensure that credence assignments to 
eyewitness testimony are appropriately lowered.  
 
In recent work, however, Kourken Michaelian (2013) has argued that, in spite of the 
evidence widely discussed in psychology and legal theory, the belief forming 
processes leading to the production of eyewitness’s memories and then testimony tend 
to produce true beliefs. Based on Michaelian’s argument, it might appear that jurors 
act appropriately when they assign high credence to eyewitness testimony because 
eyewitness’s memory beliefs will tend to be true. As arguments in favour of the 
introduction of psychological findings to court have been driven by the goal of 
ensuring that jurors reduce the credence that they assign to eyewitness testimony to 
reflect the unreliability demonstrated by the effect, Michaelian’s argument seems to 
suggest that the psychological findings need not be introduced. If eyewitness’s 
memories and testimonies about witnessed events are reliable, then prima facie there 
is no reason to introduce psychological findings. 
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In this paper I reject this result. I provide a new argument that supports the conclusion 
that jurors often assign inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony. My argument 
highlights the importance of introducing psychological findings on the 
misinformation effect into the criminal trial to ensure that jurors give eyewitness 
testimony appropriate credence. However, my argument does not depend on 
establishing that eyewitness testimony is unreliable and that the credence given to this 
testimony needs to be lowered. Instead I argue that jurors are likely to give too little 
credence to some individual pieces of eyewitness testimony. While the existing 
literature on the misinformation effect emphasises how psychological findings can be 
used to encourage jurors to lower the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony, 
I emphasise how knowledge of the findings can prevent jurors from lowering the 
credence that they give to eyewitness testimony when they should not do so.  
 
I argue that where evidence has been presented suggesting that an eyewitness has 
provided testimony that includes inaccurate details, jurors are likely to lower the 
credence that they assign to all or a substantial part of an eyewitness testimony, 
concluding that the eyewitness is either motivated to deceive or lacking a good supply 
of true beliefs about the event about which they are testifying. However, if the error is 
due to the misinformation effect then the eyewitness is likely to have a good supply of 
true beliefs that she is motivated to provide via her testimony. In these types of cases, 
the juror would be more likely to make a correct credence assignment, because she 
would be less likely to lower the credence that she gives to all or a substantial part of 
the eyewitness’s testimony, if she were aware of the psychological findings on the 
misinformation effect. These psychological findings would show that people can 
make errors in their testimony (due to the misinformation effect) but nonetheless be 
trustworthy sources of much information about the case. And the same psychological 
studies could aid the juror in identifying whether, for any individual piece of 
information provided via testimony, errors are likely to have been made.  
 
2. The misinformation effect and (un)reliable eyewitnesses 
There is now a vast body of psychological literature on the misinformation effect, 
showing how eyewitness testimony can become distorted as a result of information 
presented to the witness after they have witnessed an event. For example, Elizabeth 
Loftus and J.C. Palmer (1974) presented experimental participants with images of a 
car crash. Some participants were then asked how fast the cars involved in the crash 
were travelling when they “hit” each other while others were asked how fast the cars 
were travelling when they “smashed” into each other. Those who were asked the 
question using the word “smashed” were more likely to falsely report that there was 
broken glass in the image. In another experiment, participants were also shown an 
image of a car at a “stop” sign and then supplied with the misinformation that there 
was a “yield” sign (Loftus et al 1978). Participants provided with the misinformation 
were more likely than controls to claim that they recalled seeing a “yield” sign. In a 
more recent study, participants were shown a complex event, e.g. a girl having her 
wallet stolen by a man (Okado and Stark 2005). Then they were presented with 
misinformation about the event, e.g. that the man hurt the girl’s arm when it is was 
her neck that had been hurt. The misinformation was remembered as being a part of 
the original event 47% of the time. Hundreds of studies have now been undertaken 
demonstrating the robustness of this phenomenon (Howe and Knott 2015), which has 
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become labelled the misinformation effect because it occurs due to the influence of 
misinformation provided after an event  
 
The misinformation involved in the effect can come from a variety of sources (Loftus 
2005). Many psychological experiments, including those described above, illustrate 
how misinformation can be provided through suggestive interviewing by police 
officers or lawyers. For example, a police officer could refer to some detail (e.g. a 
“stop” sign) in her questioning, leading a witness to falsely remember that they saw 
the detail. However, a social contamination effect has also been established: it has 
also been found that people’s memories can be influenced by information provided by 
unfamiliar social peers (Gabbert et al 2004). In one experiment exemplifying this 
effect, participants were shown a video of a simulated car crash and then supplied 
with misinformation about the crash (ibid). Participants were significantly more likely 
to answer questions about the crash in a way consistent with the misinformation that 
they were supplied when the confederate, who appeared to be a social peer, provided 
it than when the information was provided in the form of a written narrative. The 
contamination effect is important when it comes to eyewitness testimony because 
witnesses often discuss with each other what they recall of a crime scene (ibid.). This 
provides an opportunity for them to contaminate each other’s memories of the details 
of the crime.  
 
The misinformation effect leads to distorted memories. When these distorted 
memories are about the details of a criminal case, and expressed in eyewitness 
testimony, they lead the testimony to include inaccurate details. As a result, findings 
on the misinformation effect have “challenged prevailing views about the validity of 
memory and raised serious concerns about the reliability of eyewitness testimony” 
(Zaragoza et al 2007: 37). They have led the leading researcher on the misinformation 
effect, Elizabeth Loftus and her colleague to conclude that “[...] Eyewitness testimony 
is very powerful and convincing to jurors, even though it is not particularly 
reliable”(Laney and Loftus 2017). In a recent overview of research on memory 
distortion and eyewitness testimony, the impact of the research was summarized as 
follows:  
 
For decades, psychologists and defense attorneys have maintained that 
eyewitness testimony can be notoriously unreliable, and courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have recognized this fact (Wise et al 2009). 
 
In presenting psychological evidence in support of their view that eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable, these authors provide reason for jurors to lower the credence 
they give to eyewitness testimony to reflect the potential for eyewitness error.  
 
In response to the findings on the misinformation effect, questions have been raised 
about the ability of jurors to determine whether eyewitness testimony is accurate and 
should be depended upon to formulate a correct verdict (e.g. Schmechel et al 2006). 
As jurors tend to find eyewitness testimony to be compelling and persuasive (e.g. 
Brigham and Bothwell 1983), but the testimony is subject to distortion due to the 
misinformation effect, jurors will tend to find evidence that can be distorted due to the 
misinformation effect to be compelling and persuasive. Under such conditions, jurors 
overestimate the adequacy of the testimony. Psychologists and legal theorists 
therefore argue that jurors should be informed about the psychological findings, so 
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that they are aware that eyewitness testimony can result from distorted memory, and 
the credence given to the testimony can be reduced accordingly.iii 
 
In contrast, the philosopher Kourken Michaelian (2013) presents a challenge to the 
claim that eyewitness testimony is unreliable. Michaelian argues that the process of 
incorporating information acquired after an event via testimony is a reliable one, so 
the misinformation effect reliably produces true beliefs. Michaelian presents findings 
suggesting that the information that is provided after an event, influencing the 
recollection of the event, is often accurate. He cites a study undertaken by De Paulo 
and colleagues (1996) suggesting that in the majority of interactions people do not 
intentionally tell untruths, and that the vast majority of lies are about the liar, 
presented for psychological reasons. A further study cited by Michaelian suggests that 
people tend to tell the truth as a default, choosing to lie only when telling the truth 
would hinder the their goals, for example, leading to some degree of social 
awkwardness, tension, or discomfort (Levine et al 2010, cited by Michaelian 2013).  
 
What these studies suggest is that people tend to tell the truth when they have no 
motive to deceive. Moreover, where people are deceptive, it is usually in presenting 
information about themselves. This means that as long as the people sharing 
information about a crime to an eyewitness are knowledgeable about the subject 
matter that they are discussing, and are not talking about themselves, or aiming to 
achieve some goal that they cannot achieve through truth-telling, they are likely to 
present accurate information. If this information is integrated with other information 
deriving from memory, then the product is likely to be true beliefs about the crime 
that has been witnessed. The incorporation of information provided by others after 
experiencing a crime will therefore be a reliable belief forming process. Michaelian 
concludes that: 
 
given the operation of the honesty bias, most […] of the testimony received by 
an agent will be true; and if most of the testimony received by an agent is true, 
then […] the unknowing incorporation of testimonial information into 
episodic memory is a reliable process for the formation of memory beliefs 
(2013, 2450).  
Michaelian’s argument challenges the idea that eyewitness testimony is unreliable, 
suggesting that the memory beliefs on which eyewitness testimony depends tend to 
accurately reflect the reality of the crime because they are influenced by the true 
testimony that others have provided to the eyewitness.iv  
 
Michaelian’s argument also provides reason to doubt that jurors assign inappropriate 
credence to eyewitness testimony. It might be argued that it is appropriate for jurors to 
take eyewitness testimony to be compelling and persuasive if the testimony tends to 
accurately reflect the reality of the crime that the testimony is about. If jurors assign 
appropriate credence to eyewitness testimony without being informed by 
psychological findings on the misinformation effect then there will be no benefit to 
introducing these findings into the courtroom. Therefore, Michaelian’s argument 
appears to present a challenge to both the idea that jurors assign inappropriate 
credence to eyewitness testimony and the idea that jurors are more likely to assign 
appropriate credence to eyewitness testimony if they are informed by psychological 
findings on the misinformation effect.  
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What, then, should be thought about jurors’ responses to eyewitness testimony? Do 
jurors assign inappropriate credence to eyewitness testimony? Should psychological 
findings on the misinformation effect be introduced into the courtroom to prevent this 
error? It might seem that the debate between psychologists like Loftus and Michaelian 
needs to be settled to answer these questions. However, in this paper I do not aim to 
settle this debate. Instead, I propose a new argument that shows that jurors are likely 
to assign inappropriate credence to some eyewitness testimony. The argument does 
not depend on existing arguments in support of the view that eyewitness testimony is 
unreliable, nor upon arguments claiming to establish that it is reliable. However, as 
we shall see in section 9, the argument does provide new support for the conclusion 
that eyewitness testimony is more reliable than has been appreciated by psychologists 
who argue that the credence assigned to eyewitness testimony should be lowered. The 
argument therefore occupies an interesting position relative to the existing debates: I 
agree with psychologists like Loftus that jurors assign inappropriate credence to 
eyewitness testimony and with Michaelian that eyewitness testimony is more reliable 
than it is often taken to be. 
 
3. A new look at juror credence assignments 
The new argument I propose is the overcritical juror argument. According to the 
overcritical juror argument psychological findings on the misinformation effect 
should be utilised within the legal system not because this could ensure that the 
credence given to eyewitness testimony is lowered appropriately to reflect the 
potential for error due to the misinformation effect but instead because this could 
prevent the credence given to individual pieces of eyewitness testimony from being 
lowered inappropriately.  
 
For the sake of the current discussion, a consequentialist approach is adopted when 
discussing what it is to lower credence appropriately. It is assumed that it is 
appropriate to lower the credence given to an individual piece of eyewitness 
testimony only if, in so doing, one increases the chance of a correct verdict being 
reached about the case in which the testimony is used. One inappropriately lowers the 
credence given to an individual piece of eyewitness testimony if, in so doing, one 
decreases the chance of a correct verdict being reached. My claim is that the 
psychological findings on the misinformation effect present very good reason to think 
that the credence given to individual pieces of eyewitness testimony is frequently 
lowered in a way that reduces the chance of a correct verdict being reached. On a 
more positive note, the same psychological findings can be utilised within the legal 
system to prevent errors of this type from occurring.   
 
4. The cases 
The cases that are of interest are those in which an eyewitness appears to be 
discredited because of a single or small number of errors in their testimony. The 
following are examples. An eyewitness describes a car travelling at a specific speed 
but CCTV evidence shows that the car was travelling more quickly or slowly. An 
eyewitness claims that a car involved in an accident passed a yield sign when there 
was actually only a stop sign at the scene. An eyewitness claims that the person who 
committed a crime was wearing glasses but photographic evidence suggests that they 
were not. In the specific cases of interest, jurors who are assessing the credibility of 
an eyewitness’s testimony conclude one or both of two things: (i) the eyewitness 
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intends to deceive by providing false details; (ii) the eyewitness does not have a good 
supply of true memories about the event about which they are testifying. This section 
establishes that these types of reactions occur.v 
 
Let us first consider how jurors might come to conclude that an eyewitness has an 
intention to deceive on the basis of evidence of errors in their testimony. One 
important role of jurors is to detect whether an eyewitness intends to deceive (see, e.g. 
Seniuk 2013), but people, including those working within the legal system, are 
generally no better than chance at discerning whether someone has honest or 
dishonest motives in providing information (Bond and DePaulo 2006; Ekman and 
O’Sullivan 1991). One clue that is often taken to indicate that a person who is 
testifying is being dishonest is inconsistencies or errors in their testimony (ten Brinke 
and Porter 2013). And people who adopt an initial position of mistrust towards an 
individual are especially likely to view errors as evidence of an intention to deceive 
(Meissner and Kassin 2004). The nature of criminal cases is that stakes are high and 
there can be numerous actors with competing goals, so jurors will often adopt a 
starting point of suspicion, suspecting any eyewitness of having a motivation to 
deceive. When these factors are combined, jurors are likely to take evidence of errors 
to indicate that a person has an intention to deceive. This is especially likely where 
the erroneous evidence is perceived as providing support for a verdict that the 
eyewitness is expected to favour. A juror could then lower the credence given to all or 
many substantive parts of the eyewitness’s testimony, that is, those parts of the 
testimony that indicate something significant about the guilt or innocence of certain 
suspects, on the basis that they think that the eyewitness intended to deceive when 
providing the details. 
 
Now let us consider how jurors might come to conclude on the basis of evidence of a 
single or small number of errors that an eyewitness does not have a good supply of 
true memories about the event about which they are testifying. Support for this claim 
comes from a series of psychological studies on the effect of eyewitness error. The 
studies show that where an eyewitness provides details that are refuted the overall 
credibility of the eyewitness testimony is reduced. For instance, where participants in 
an experiment were given two sets of contradictory evidence from fictional 
eyewitnesses about a fictional car accident, and one set included trivial details that 
were refuted, the testimony of the eyewitness who provided those details was 
subsequently given less credibility (Borckardt, Sprohge and Nash 2003). A similar 
effect occurred when experimental participants were shown testimony containing 
inconsistencies; they found the eyewitness to be less effective and were unlikely to 
convict on the basis of the testimony (Berman and Cutler 1996; Hatvany and Strack 
1980), even when the inconsistencies related to trivial details (Berman, Narby and 
Cutler 1995). It is important that testimony was discredited, and not taken to provide 
the support for a particular verdict that it would otherwise seem to be provide, when 
the errors that were demonstrated related to trivial information. The truth or falsity of 
the trivial details would not establish guilt or innocence. Nonetheless, those fulfilling 
the juror role were less likely to convict when the trivial details were shown to contain 
errors or be inconsistent with other evidence. This shows that errors in some details 
within an eyewitness’s testimony, i.e. the trivial details, are taken to undermine the 
credibility of other details, i.e. those that indicate guilt or innocence. Eyewitnesses are 
assumed, based on a small number of trivial errors, to lack a generally good supply of 
true memories. These experimental findings thus provide good reason for thinking 
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that that jurors are susceptible to concluding that an eyewitness lacks a good supply of 
true beliefs about a case based on evidence of a single or small number of errors.  
 
5. Eyewitness error and the intention to deceive 
In the next three sections I aim to show that the juror who responds to evidence of 
error in eyewitness testimony by concluding (i) or (ii) will be susceptible to assigning 
inappropriately low credence to various of the eyewitness’s beliefs when the error is 
due to the misinformation effect. This section focuses on how the conclusion that 
evidence of error shows that the eyewitness has an intention to deceive will be false 
when their error is due to the misinformation effect. To see this point, it is useful to 
reflect upon the explanation of the effect given in the cognitive sciences, and how it 
implies that the effect occurs without being caused by a motivation to deceive.  
 
The misinformation effect is argued by cognitive scientists to be the result of the 
ordinary operation of human cognitive mechanisms. The effect has been explained by 
appeal to the constructive nature of memory (see e.g. Loftus 2005; Michaelian 2013; 
Schacter et al. 2011). According to constructivism, traces of information rather than 
discreet records of events are stored to memory and the traces are combined at the 
point of retrieval to construct a representation of a past event. This phenomenon is 
taken to explain the misinformation effect in the following way: Traces of 
information about one’s personal experience of an event can become combined with 
traces of information of being provided with testimony or information about being 
suggestively questioned so that one falsely recalls events in a way that is consistent 
with information provided after the event (ibid.). Where the information that is 
provided after the event by others is misinformation the result is the misinformation 
effect: distorted memories are formed that are consistent with the misinformation 
rather than genuinely reflecting the event as experienced. 
 
As such, the effect does not occur due to any intention to deceive on the part of the 
believer. Some memory distortions seem to have motivational components, for 
example, memory systems can filter incoming information in ways that are self-
enhancing, supporting a positive view of the person doing the remembering (Wilson 
and Ross 2003; Sutton 2009). However, even in these cases, the motivational 
component of the distortion is not taken to involve any consciously chosen intention 
to deceive. Moreover, the misinformation effect in particular is explained at the level 
of cognitive mechanism without reference to the motivation of the person who 
possesses the cognitive mechanism (see, e.g. Schacter et al 2011). This means that 
even an eyewitness testifier who is strongly driven by the desire to provide true 
testimony, and who has no conflicting desires, can be susceptible to the effect.  
 
As errors in the details provided within eyewitness testimony can be the result of the 
misinformation effect, and the misinformation effect is not caused by an intention to 
deceive, errors in the details of testimony can occur in the absence of an intention to 
deceive. Jurors who assess the credibility of an eyewitness who provides erroneous 
testimony due to the misinformation effect and conclude that they intend to deceive 
are therefore likely to inappropriately lower the credence that they give to much of the 
eyewitness’s testimony. 
 
6. Eyewitness error and a good supply of true memories 
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Let us now consider the second conclusion that could be drawn on the basis of 
evidence of error in an eyewitness account: that the eyewitness does not have a good 
supply of true beliefs about the event about which they are testifying. This section 
shows that it is consistent with evidence of error in an eyewitness account that occurs 
due to misinformation effect that the eyewitness has a good supply of true beliefs 
about the event that they could provide in their testimony.  
 
It is, first of all, consistent with evidence of error in an eyewitness’s account that she 
is intellectually virtuous (Montmarquet 1987, 1993; Zagzebski 1996).vivii In section 5 
it was shown that the best existing explanation of the effect suggests that an 
eyewitness can be properly motivated to provide true testimony but nonetheless make 
errors due to the effect. This means that the eyewitness can be conscientious in the 
way that she attempts to recall information from her memory, she can be open-
minded about what happened, she can be driven by the aim to pay attention to detail 
and display many other intellectual virtues (Montmarquet 1987, 1993; Zagzebski 
1996), and so on, but nonetheless make errors in her recall of an event due to the 
misinformation effect. As long as there is good reason to think that a person who 
displays intellectual virtues of this kind is likely to have many true beliefs about any 
particular event, it is consistent with errors due to the misinformation effect that the 
eyewitness can have a good supply of true beliefs about an event as a result of being 
intellectually virtuous. 
 
Second of all, a person is likely to have a good supply of true beliefs about the gist of 
an event that they have experienced even if they lack true beliefs about the details of 
that event. For example, an eyewitness might falsely recall that a person involved in 
an accident passed a “stop” sign rather than a “yield” sign but nonetheless accurately 
recall that one person travelling at a dangerous speed caused the accident. What 
reason is there for thinking this? Psychological studies suggest that human memory 
systems form two sorts of representations of events: gist representations and verbatim 
representations (Brainerd & Reyna 2002). This fact is taken to explain the 
phenomenon found in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott series of experiments 
(developed by Deese 1959, and revised by Roediger & McDermott 1995). In these 
experiments participants are shown a list of words (e.g. baker, butter, filling, brown, 
dough, grain, flour, knife, wheat, old) and asked to recall them. They systematically 
and predictably claim to have studied words that are not on the list but are 
semantically related to words on the list (e.g. bread). This phenomenon is explained in 
the following way: the participants form a gist representation of the items in the list 
(e.g. bread-related items) as well as a verbatim representation (containing each 
individual item). When they come to recall the items they utilise the gist-
representation, filling out the details in the list in a way that fits the common theme of 
the list. They make the error of claiming that they studied unstudied words because 
they include items that fit the theme captured by the gist representation but were not 
on the original list. It is thought that the gist-representation remains while the 
verbatim representation fades (Brainerd & Reyna 2002), allowing the rememberer to 
retain key information even as their grasp of the details fade. The dissociation 
between the two forms of representation means that an eyewitness might lack an 
accurate representation of some of the details of an event but nonetheless be a good 
source of information about the gist of the event.  
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Psychological studies also suggest that the eyewitness will have a good supply about 
many details of an event other than those about which she has provided erroneous 
testimony. The studies suggest that at least one of a number of “eliciting” or 
triggering conditions need to be in place for the misinformation effect to occur 
(Loftus 2005), and, for any event, these conditions might be in place for some details 
about the event but not others. Most obviously, for the misinformation effect to occur, 
misinformation about the details of an event must be made available to the person 
who misremembers. For example, an eyewitness must be exposed to suggestive 
questioning or provided misinformation from another eyewitness about the specific 
detail. A person can be provided misinformation about some particular detail of an 
event (e.g. the type of sign that a car passed through) but not some other detail (e.g. 
the colour of the car). She can consequently be subject to the misinformation effect 
with respect to her memories of some details of the event but in a position to provide 
accurate details about others.  
 
Other factors that determine whether a person is susceptible to the misinformation 
effect include: (i) the time that passes between them being provided with misleading 
information and them being asked about the event (Loftus et al 1978); (ii) whether or 
not they think that they were in a good position to form an accurate memory (e.g. 
whether or not they think they were drunk when the incident occurred) (Assefi and 
Garry 2002); (iii) the social status of the person who provides the misinformation 
(Dodd and Bradshaw 1980; Smith and Ellsworth 1987; Underwood and Pezdek, 
1998); (iv) whether or not the accent of the person who provides the misinformation 
conveys that they are powerful and socially attractive (Vornik et al 2003); (v) whether 
or not there is a strong discrepancy between the person’s memories of the event and 
the information provided about the event (Tousignant et al 1986); (vi) whether the 
person pays attention at the point of encoding the information and the point of 
retrieval (Zaragoza and Lane 1998); (vii) whether or not the person is repeatedly 
exposed to the misleading information (Zaragoza and Mitchell 1996; Mitchell and 
Zaragoza, 1996). 
 
For any event, some of these triggering conditions might be present for some details 
of an event but not others. For example, one might undergo repeated questioning 
about whether a person accused of dangerous driving passed through a “stop” sign 
without stopping, while the colours of the cars involved in the accident are never 
mentioned to you. Or you might confidently remember the make and model of the 
car, because you are a car mechanic so think that you were in a good position to form 
an accurate memory of this detail, and vehemently reject the suggestion that the car 
was another make and model, thereby avoiding the misinformation effect. But you 
might simultaneously be susceptible to misremembering that there was a “stop” sign 
because you did not attend to the street signs at the scene of the crime. In cases of this 
sort, psychological studies suggest that some details of an event are likely to be 
misremembered due to the misinformation effect while other details are remembered 
accurately. 
 
Furthermore, there is reason to think that people will often avoid the misinformation 
effect even when they could be susceptible (Michaelian 2011). Source-monitoring 
errors are a leading explanation of the misinformation effect (for reviews see e.g. 
Belli and Loftus 1994; Lindsay 1994; Mitchell and Johnson, 2000). The 
misinformation effect involves people misidentifying memories that have their source 
 10 
in testimony as memories that have their source in experience. But cognitive scientists 
argue that source-monitoring errors are exceptional because traces of information 
stored in memory bear the mark of their origins (Johnson 1988). For example, 
memory representations of events that have been perceived are usually experienced as 
more vivid than memory representations of events that are dreamed (Mitchell and 
Johnson 2000). Source-monitoring involves comparing the experiential characteristics 
associated with the representations to expectations of what the characteristics would 
be like if they were produced by, for example, experience rather than dreaming (ibid). 
The experiential differences between the representations ensure that people are often 
good at identifying their source through this comparison (Michaelian 2011). The 
process is not infallible, of course: the fallibility of the process explains how the 
misinformation effect occurs, but it is thought that the process is reliable because the 
marks of origin reliably indicate the source of memories (ibid.). Work on source-
monitoring thus suggests that people often avoid the misinformation effect because 
they can properly identify the source of some misinformation that they have been 
supplied. Consequently, evidence that a person has made an error that is the result of 
the misinformation effect does not mean that she is likely to make numerous other 
errors.viii  
 
In sum, then, findings from the cognitive sciences strongly suggest that a person can 
display errors in her eyewitness testimony due to the misinformation effect while 
nonetheless having a good supply of true beliefs about the event about which she is 
testifying. She might (a) have an excellent intellectual character; (b) be able to 
accurately remember the gist of what happened in the event; and (c) be able to 
accurately remember many details. This means that jurors who conclude on the basis 
of evidence of errors in an eyewitness’s testimony about an event that she lacks a 
good supply of true beliefs relating to the event are likely to inappropriately lower the 
credence they give to some details in the testimony. 
 
7. Errors and the Ordinary Functioning of Good Eyewitnesses 
The argument presented so far provides reason for accepting that it is consistent with 
an eyewitness providing testimony that includes false details that she has a good 
supply of true beliefs that she is motivated to provide in the witness stand. This 
section shows that, if leading theories in cognitive science and contemporary 
philosophy of memory are correct, the errors that occur due to the misinformation 
effect are the result of a feature of human cognitive systems which can bring 
substantial epistemic benefits. Moreover, the epistemic benefits gained through this 
feature or these features of human cognition increase the chance of any person being a 
good eyewitness. This means that errors in testimony can be a sign of the ordinary 
operation of the cognitive mechanisms that make human beings able to be good 
eyewitnesses.  
 
To substantiate this point, I first outline various descriptions of the functions of the 
cognitive mechanisms that produce the misinformation effect provided in the 
cognitive sciences and philosophy of memory (in section 7.1). I show that all of the 
functions bring distinctive epistemic benefits (section 7.2). I argue that the 
mechanisms are epistemically innocent: although they bring epistemic costs they also 
bring substantial epistemic benefits that would otherwise be missed (section 7.2). 
Then I show that the benefits facilitate humans, who each possess the mechanisms, 
being good eyewitnesses (section 7.3).   
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Epistemic benefits are defined for the purposes of the current discussion as features of 
a cognitive system that facilitate the achievement of epistemic goals “ including 
acquiring new true beliefs; retaining and using relevant information; increasing the 
coherence of a set of beliefs; and gaining understanding” (Puddifoot and Bortolotti 
2018).  There has been a great deal of discussion within the cognitive sciences about 
how memory distortions, such as the misinformation effect, are the result of the 
ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms that are adaptive (see, e.g. Schacter el al. 
2007; Sutton 2009; Schacter 2011). However, the current discussion focuses on how 
the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the memory distortion bring specifically 
epistemic benefits. 
 
7.1. Functions of constructive memory systems 
As discussed in section 5, the misinformation effect is explained by leading cognitive 
scientists as being a result of the constructive nature of human memory systems (see, 
e.g. Loftus 2005; Michaelian 2013; Schacter et al. 2011). The archival view of 
memory, according to which memory functions like a storehouse, storing complete 
and discreet records of events, is now generally rejected and a variety of versions of 
constructivism have come to dominate the cognitive science and philosophy of 
memory (Robins 2016, for defences of constructivism see e.g. Bartlett 1932; Neisser 
1967; Suddendorf and Corballis 1997, 2007; Loftus 2005; Schacter and Addis 2007, 
Schacter et al 2007, Schacter et al 2011; Shanton and Goldman 2010; Michaelian 
2011, 2013, 2016a, 2016b; Klein 2013; De Brigard 2014).  
 
Constructivists argue that the cognitive mechanisms responsible for memory support 
functions other than accurately representing the past (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; 
Schacter and Addis 2007; De Brigard 2014; Michaelian 2016a,b). According to 
constructivism, the best way to explain the frequency of the systematic and 
predictable memory errors studied in the cognitive sciences—including the 
misinformation effect—is to suppose that the production of accurate representations 
of the past is not the sole, or even the main, function of the cognitive mechanisms that 
support remembering (Sutton 1998; Michaelian 2012; De Brigard 2014). ix 
Constructivists appeal to evidence suggesting that people with pathologies like 
Alzheimer’s are less prone to some common memory errors that are the result of the 
process of construction (Schacter et al 1996; Schacter et al 1997; Melo et al. 1999). 
This evidence is taken to show that failing to accurately represent the past is a part of 
the proper functioning of the cognitive mechanisms that underpin memory—proper 
functioning that is disturbed in cases of the pathology involved with Alzheimer’s. If 
inaccurately representing the past is a part of the proper functioning of the cognitive 
mechanisms responsible for memory then accurately remembering the past cannot be 
the sole function of those mechanisms. Furthermore, constructivists appeal to 
evidence suggesting that susceptibility to common memory errors correlates with the 
ability to successfully complete some cognitive tasks, including those involving 
convergent thinking (Howe et al 2010; Dewhurst et al 2011).  Each of these findings 
are taken to support the conclusion that the cognitive mechanisms that produce 
memories, including the distorted memories produced as a result of the 
misinformation effect, subserve a broader cognitive function, encapsulating but not 
limited to remembering past events. 
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There is some disagreement among constructivists about the precise functions that are 
subserved by the cognitive mechanisms that produce memories. What follows is a 
survey of the constructivist positions.  
 
On the mental time travel view, the goal of the cognitive mechanisms is mental time 
travel: the projection of the self into the past or future (Tulving 1985; Suddendorf and 
Corballis 1997, 2007).  
 
[...]Episodic memory implies a mental reconstruction of some earlier event, 
including at least some of the particularities of that event, such as the principal 
characters involved, the actions that took place, the setting, and the emotional 
reactions. Metaphorically speaking, it might be regarded as the result of a 
mental journey into the past. This idea is readily extended to the future. Based 
on previous experiences, we can imagine specific events in the future, 
including the sorts of particularities that have characterized events in the past 
(Suddendorf and Corballis 2007: 301).  
 
On the mental time travel view, remembering involves mental time travel into the 
past, but it is unlikely that the cognitive mechanisms evolved to support time travel in 
this direction. The adaptive advantage of mental time travel comes from its 
facilitation of time travel into the future: i.e. the ability to experience how future 
events are going to be (Suddendorf and Corballis 2007). By accurately predicting the 
future, mental time travel supports good decision-making, which increases fitness.  
 
The following evidence is used to support the mental time travel model: (i) Evidence 
that increased distance of an event from the present reduces the phenomenological 
richness of the experience of the event regardless of whether the event is in the past or 
future (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden 2004). (ii) Evidence that patients with 
amnesia who are unable to answer questions about yesterday are also unable to 
answer questions about tomorrow (Klein et al. 2002; Tulving 1985). (iii) Evidence 
that patients with depression who struggle to retrieve information about specific 
events in their past also struggle to imagine future episodes (Williams et al. 1996). 
(iv) Evidence that children gain the ability to answer questions about yesterday and 
tomorrow at the same age: around 4 years old (Busby & Suddendorf 2005). (v) Brain-
imaging studies suggesting that the same “core network” of neural regions are utilised 
in remembering the past and predicting the future (Okuda et al. 2003). Each of these 
findings suggests that the ability to project oneself into the past and future are 
supported by the same cognitive mechanisms. A plausible evolutionary explanation of 
the existence of the cognitive mechanisms is that their primary function is to facilitate 
the projection into the future required for good quality decision-making.  
 
Daniel Schacter and Donna Addis (2007, see also Schacter et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 
2011) defend a similar view of the functions of the cognitive mechanisms supporting 
memory to that of the mental time travel model, but focus more closely on the 
operation of constructive processes. According to their constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis, the primary function of human memory systems is the flexible 
simulation of future events.x The constructive nature of human memory facilitates 
accurate simulation of future events because the future never precisely resembles the 
past. Constructive cognitive mechanisms allow information from various different 
events to be abstracted and combined to simulate novel future events. Although the 
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process of construction facilitates accurate simulations of the future, it also explains 
errors such as the misinformation effect because the process of construction can 
involve “miscombining elements” (Schacter et al. 2011), including from memory and 
testimony.  
 
The idea that the function of memory is to simulate the future has received uptake 
from philosophers of memory defending simulationist approaches to memory 
(Shanton and Goldman 2010; Michaelian 2011, 2016a,b). On the simulationist view, 
remembering is “generating a more or less probable representation of a target event” 
(Michaelian 2016b, 6). Successful remembering can be distinguished from 
unsuccessful remembering, such as confabulation, on the basis that successful 
remembering is produced by memory systems operating in ways that tend to produce 
true simulations whereas confabulation occurs through memory systems operating in 
ways that tend to produce false simulations (ibid).  
 
In defending his episodic hypothetical thinking model, Felipe De Brigard (2014) 
argues that the cognitive mechanisms that produce memories operate to meet a 
broader goal than that specified within the mental time travel and constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis views: the formation of simulations of what might 
happen or might have already happened to us.xi De Brigard argues that his view is 
consistent with a vast body of evidence. It is consistent with the evidence suggesting 
that the same cognitive mechanisms underpin projection into the past and future, 
which also supports the mental time travel view and the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis. If the main function of the cognitive mechanisms is to develop 
representations of events that might happen or might have already happened to us 
then these representations could be used to project oneself into the past or future. The 
episodic hypothetical thinking model is also consistent with evidence that memory 
retrieval is sensitive to the probability of an event happening in a particular context. 
For example, the rate at which participants correctly or incorrectly recalled that an 
item was found in a context was predicted by their judgements of the likelihood that 
the item would be found in the context (Hemmer and Steyvens 2009). On this view, 
the way that memories are constructed reflects the probability that the event occurred 
(in any particular way): constructions are plausible representations of ways that things 
could be.  
 
De Brigard’s view is distinct from the mental time travel view and constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis because it suggests that the main functions of the 
cognitive mechanisms that produce memories include facilitating thinking about 
counterfactuals, i.e. what could have happened but did not. Support for this more 
inclusive view of the functions of memory systems comes from the following sources: 
(i) Evidence that children begin counterfactual thinking at the same time memories 
begin consolidating in long-term memory and when episodic future planning begins 
(German and Nichols 2003). (ii) Evidence of patients with deficits in both episodic 
memory and counterfactual reasoning, for example, evidence that people with 
amnesia provide impoverished descriptions of plausible imagined events (Rosenbaum 
et al 2009; Hassabis et al 2007). (iii) Evidence suggesting that there are similarities in 
the phenomenology and amount of details given by participants during thinking about 
episodes in the past and future and during counterfactual thinking (De Birgard and 
Giovanello 2012). (iv) Evidence that the same “core network” of brain regions are 
implicated in counterfactual thinking and recollection of autobiographical information 
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(Addis et al 2009; van Hoeck 2012). Each of these pieces of evidence is consistent 
with the cognitive mechanisms underpinning memory having as their main function 
the formation of simulations about what might happen or might have happened to us, 
including simulations of counterfactual events. On this view, the misinformation 
effect would occur due to the binding together of information from experience and 
testimony to formulate a plausible hypothesis about what might have happened in the 
past.xii  
 
In sum, then, recent research from the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of 
memory suggests that memory errors such as those present in the misinformation 
effect are the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms that support 
functions other than the representation of past events: (i) projection into the future 
required for good quality decision-making, (ii) flexible construction of simulations of 
the future, and/or (iii) hypothetical thinking about what might happen or might have 
happened (including counterfactual thinking). 
 
7.2. Epistemic Benefits and Epistemic Innocence 
Each of the functions ascribed to the cognitive mechanisms underpinning memory 
(and outlined in section 6.1) brings substantial epistemic benefits. Projection of 
oneself into the future facilitates numerous epistemic goals. It produces beliefs about 
the future. When successful, the projection produces true beliefs about the future. 
When it draws upon past experiences, projection into the future produces beliefs 
about the future that cohere with beliefs about the past. It allows one to navigate one’s 
environment by setting expectations about features likely to be found in an 
environment. It can therefore facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and 
understanding downstream. For example, a scientist designing the methodology for an 
experiment might project herself into the future experimental setting. In the process, 
she might form true beliefs about the future. She might form beliefs about the 
experiment that fit with her beliefs about past experiments. As a result, she might 
have correct expectations about what measurements to make and data to gather. She 
might consequently obtain scientific knowledge and understanding as a result of 
successful mental time travel.  
 
The construction of simulations of future events from traces of information about 
various different past events brings an extra epistemic benefit, in addition to the 
general benefits of mental time travel. It facilitates the flexibility of thought and 
creativity required to predict novel events, which are unlike any single event that has 
previously been experienced. Once these events are predicted, the agent will be in a 
good position to gain knowledge and understanding about the events and their 
consequences.  
 
Engagement in hypothetical thinking about what might happen and what might have 
happened also facilitates the achievement of epistemic goals. Episodic hypothetical 
thinking facilitates the imagination of events that have not yet been experienced, 
providing a source of creativity, which allows people to determine what is likely to 
happen. It is therefore a source of knowledge and understanding. It focuses the 
attention of an agent on likely outcomes. When interpreting the past, making 
predictions about the future, or considering what might have been but was not, there 
are countless possibilities to countenance. Therefore, the task of selecting likely 
outcomes could be extremely computationally complex, intractable even. Episodic 
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hypothetical thinking formulates representations of only a subset of these 
possibilities: those that could plausibly have occurred. It therefore simplifies what 
could otherwise be an intractable computational task so that correct judgements are 
more likely to be made about what could have happened and what could happen in the 
future.  
 
Due to the epistemic benefits associated with the ordinary functioning of the cognitive 
mechanisms that produce false memory beliefs like those produced by the 
misinformation effect, Katherine Puddifoot and Lisa Bortolotti (2018) have argued 
that the mechanisms are epistemically innocent. A cognitive mechanism is 
epistemically innocent if it meets the following conditions: 
 
• (Epistemic Cost) Cognitive mechanism produces epistemically costly 
cognitive states. 
• (Epistemic Benefit) Cognitive mechanism has some significant epistemic 
benefits for an agent. 
• (No Alternatives) There is no available alternative cognitive mechanism that 
would enable the agent to avoid the epistemic costs while conferring the same 
epistemic benefits. 
 
The memory mechanisms that produce the misinformation effect are epistemically 
costly because they lead to the production of false memory beliefs, for example, 
memory beliefs that incorporate false information provided via suggestive police 
questioning. Furthermore, when people have false memory beliefs, or even true 
memory beliefs that misrepresent the source of the beliefs (as in the misinformation 
effect), they lack self-knowledge. However, as has been demonstrated so far in 
section 7, on the best existing theories in the cognitive science and philosophy of 
memory the same cognitive mechanisms also bring significant epistemic benefits. The 
mechanisms facilitate the successful prediction of the future, allow the flexible 
recombination of information drawn from various past experiences, and/or allow 
hypothetical thinking about episodes that are likely to occur. Each of these functions 
brings substantial epistemic gains. Meanwhile, there are no alternative human 
cognitive mechanisms that operate like storehouses, storing complete and accurate 
records of past events, and therefore invulnerable to errors such as those involved in 
the misinformation effect. The cognitive mechanisms that produce the misinformation 
effect are therefore epistemically innocent.  
 
The epistemic innocence of the cognitive mechanisms that produce memory errors, 
including through the misinformation effect, is important because it is intuitive that 
evidence that a mechanism produces false memory beliefs and is susceptible to falsely 
representing past experiences is only negative from an epistemic perspective 
(Puddifoot and Bortolotti 2018). People who display memory errors, including the 
misinformation effect, can be taken to be poor epistemic agents, and poor sources of 
information. However, memory errors such as those produced by the misinformation 
effect should not be taken to indicate that a person is a poor epistemic agent. The 
errors should not be viewed wholly badly from an epistemic perspective. This is 
because the memory errors can be an indication of the ordinary operation of cognitive 
mechanisms that bring substantial epistemic benefits, facilitating the achievement of 
important epistemic goals.  
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7.3. Epistemic Innocence and Eyewitness Error 
The ideas of section 7.2 can now be applied to the case of eyewitnesses in criminal 
trials who make errors as a result of the misinformation effect. When they make the 
errors, there are subsequent epistemic costs: they misrepresent a detail of the crime 
that they have witnessed and lack self-knowledge about some of what they have 
experienced. However, the error is due to the ordinary operation of constructive 
cognitive mechanisms that are epistemically innocent: although the cognitive 
mechanisms produce errors, they bring significant epistemic benefits that would 
otherwise be missed. Moreover, importantly, the epistemic benefits make human 
beings able to be good eyewitnesses. Therefore, an eyewitness can display errors in 
their testimony due to the ordinary functioning of cognitive mechanisms that make 
them otherwise a good eyewitness, with a good supply of true beliefs to provide via 
their testimony. To illustrate this point, we will now consider each of the functions 
identified in sections 7.1 with the constructive cognitive mechanisms underpinning 
memory and how the epistemic benefits that they bring increase the chance of people 
being good eyewitnesses.  
 
Being able to project oneself into the future is crucial to giving requisite attention to 
the features of a crime that occurs in one’s presence, and to identifying what 
information about a crime will be relevant to future investigations. Imagine that there 
is a collision between two cars after one car passed over some traffic lights into a 
dangerous position at an intersection. What would make a person a good eyewitness 
in this case? She would notice that the car was passing into a dangerous position at 
the intersection. Then she would attend closely to the situation. She would be 
attentive to the colour of light that the car passed through, and the speed at which the 
car travelled, being able to predict that these are salient features of the situation. Once 
the accident occurred, she would be able to predict which features of the event would 
be important to future police investigations (colour of light, speed of travel, etc.). She 
might immediately mention these to the police to reduce the chance that she 
misremembers the details. She would engage in these activities, which would increase 
the chance of her being a good eyewitness to the case, by increasing the chance that 
she has a good supply of true beliefs about the case, because she was able to 
successfully predict the future.  
 
The epistemic benefits of being able to project oneself into the future would here 
manifest as having true beliefs about what is likely to happen, what it is important to 
attend to, and what information should be passed on to the police. The downstream 
epistemic benefits of projection into the future would include the knowledge about the 
crime gained due to the proper attention paid to salient features of the situation. 
 
Flexibly recombining pieces of information about various events facilitates being a 
good eyewitness by allowing people to draw on their own experiences of numerous 
different experiences to predict features of what will often be a novel event: the 
experience of witnessing a crime. Eyewitnesses will commonly not have had previous 
experiences of witnessing crimes, or, if they have had experiences of this type, the 
crimes and their experiences of witnessing those crimes will differ. They will 
therefore need to think flexibly, combining information about various different 
experiences that they have had that are similar in some respect to the current 
experience to make a prediction about what is likely to occur, what information is 
likely to be useful to criminal investigations, and so on.  
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Let us now consider the epistemic benefits of the final function associated with the 
cognitive mechanisms that produce memory beliefs: episodic hypothetical thinking. 
We found in section 7.2 that episodic hypothetical thinking brings the epistemic 
benefits of facilitating creative thinking about events that have not occurred and of 
reducing the number of possible outcomes an agent has to consider when thinking 
about what might happen by eliminating outcomes that are implausible. Creative 
thinking is crucial to imagining what is likely to happen in a crime, and what is likely 
to be relevant in a criminal trial. The tendency to selectively imagine only events that 
are likely to happen will increase the likelihood that an eyewitness has correct beliefs 
about what will happen, attends to appropriate information, identifies the information 
that will be relevant to a future inquiry, and so on. If an eyewitness considers only 
plausible outcomes of the crime and criminal process then considering less plausible 
outcomes will not distract her.  
 
If existing theories within the cognitive sciences and philosophy of memory are 
correct, then, the cognitive mechanisms that produce memory errors through the 
misinformation effect bring substantial epistemic benefits other than representing the 
past and these benefits facilitate humans being good eyewitnesses. Human memory 
systems support mental time travel, flexible simulation of future events, and/or 
hypothetical thinking about what might happen or have happened. Each of these 
functions is epistemically beneficial in a way that allows human beings to be good 
eyewitnesses. This means that when a person displays errors due to the 
misinformation effect, these errors are the result of the ordinary operation of cognitive 
mechanisms that facilitate people being good eyewitnesses. Errors that are likely to be 
taken to show that an eyewitness lacks a good supply of true beliefs about the case 
about which they are testifying are actually explained by the presence of cognitive 
mechanisms that facilitate having a good supply of true beliefs about the case.    
 
It is worth noting that the fact that someone has constructive cognitive mechanisms 
that facilitate mental time travel, flexible simulation of future events, or hypothetical 
thinking about what might happen or have happened does not mean that they will be a 
better eyewitness than other people. If two competing eyewitness testimonies are 
given, and one testifier is subject to the misinformation effect, then this does not mean 
that this testifier is more likely than the other to provide have a good supply of true 
beliefs about the case. This is because it is not the case that some people have 
constructive memory systems that bring the epistemic benefits identified in sections 
7.2 and the current section and others do not—they will each have constructive 
memory systems, with the epistemic benefits they bring. On the other hand, because 
all eyewitnesses have constructive memory systems, they are all susceptible to the 
misinformation effect. Therefore, evidence that one eyewitness has been susceptible 
to the effect does not provide good reason to think that they are overall less reliable 
than another eyewitness.   
 
There is substantial import to the observation that errors due to the misinformation 
effect are the result of the ordinary operation of human cognitive mechanisms that are 
epistemically innocent in ways that facilitate being a good eyewitness. It reveals the 
extent of the error that can be made by jurors when they infer from evidence of 
eyewitness error that is due to the misinformation effect that an eyewitness lacks a 
good supply of true beliefs. Not only do jurors err because it is consistent with the 
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eyewitness error that the eyewitness has a good supply of true beliefs, they err 
because the eyewitness errors are due to the operation of cognitive mechanisms that 
will, on very many occasions, ensure that a person has a good supply of true beliefs to 
deliver through their testimony.  
 
8. Eyewitness error and poor credence assignments 
The discussion in sections 3-7 provides reason for thinking that jurors are likely to 
respond to evidence of erroneous details in an eyewitness’s testimony by 
inappropriately lowering the credence given to the testimony. Where there is evidence 
that an eyewitness has made an error in her testimony, jurors are likely to conclude 
that she is either driven by the desire to deceive or that she does not have a good 
supply of true beliefs relating to the events about which she is testifying. A juror who 
responds in either of these ways, forming a belief about the trustworthiness of an 
eyewitness based on the evidence of error, and lowering the credence they give to all 
of the eyewitness’s testimony, would be likely to lower the credence she gives to 
much of the testimony in a way that decreases the chance of a correct verdict being 
made. This is because, as has been shown in sections 4-7, it is consistent with the 
eyewitness making errors in some of her testimony that she can be an excellent source 
of information about other details relating to the case.  
 
One way to respond to this conclusion is to argue that jurors should be discouraged 
from updating the credence that they assign to eyewitness testimony based on 
evidence of errors in their testimony. Or one might discourage jurors from responding 
to specific evidence of eyewitness error by forming the belief that the eyewitness is 
wholly untrustworthy. However, each of these responses risks reducing the chance of 
a correct verdict being made by allowing the testimony of witnesses who are 
motivated to deceive or do lack a good supply of true beliefs about a case to 
determine verdicts.  
 
What is the solution? To change the supply of evidence that is available to the jurors, 
so that it includes information about the misinformation effect.xiiixivxv By changing the 
epistemic environment of the jurors in this way, it will be possible to increase the 
chance they give testimony appropriate credence, by reducing the chance that they 
inappropriately lower the credence given to eyewitness testimony when an eyewitness 
makes an error due to the misinformation effect. As mentioned in section 2, the 
proposal that jurors should be informed by psychological findings relating to the 
misinformation effect is not new. Numerous authors have argued that jurors should be 
made aware of these findings so that they can lower the credence that they give to 
eyewitness testimony to reflect its susceptibility to error due to the misinformation 
effect.xvi What the current discussion shows is that the psychological findings can be 
used to achieve the opposite goal of ensuring that the credence given to individual 
pieces of eyewitness testimony is not lowered inappropriately. The achievement of 
the latter goal does not only require jurors to be aware that the misinformation effect 
occurs. It requires jurors to be aware about how representations of the gist of an event 
can be dissociated from representations of the details; about how a person can be a 
good source of information about some details relating to an event but not others; and 
about how memory errors due to the misinformation effect are indicative of the 
ordinary operation of cognitive mechanisms that facilitate being a good eyewitness. 
Moreover, it requires knowledge about the specific conditions under which people’s 
memories are susceptible to distortion due to the misinformation effect.  
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Once these details were available to jurors, they could apply their new knowledge 
about the misinformation effect to evaluate whether an individual is likely to have 
undergone the effect, and whether any individual piece of evidence is likely to have 
been distorted as a result. For example, a juror informed by the psychological findings 
might consider whether an eyewitness could have been repeatedly questioned about a 
particular detail of an event and consequently misremembered the detail due to the 
misinformation effect.1xviiThen the juror can consider whether the eyewitness is likely 
to have been subjected to similar questioning about other details about which she 
might testify. If it is concluded that the eyewitness is not likely to have been similarly 
questioned about other details that she provides then there is reason to think that her 
testimony about these details is accurate because it is less likely to be subject to the 
misinformation effect. The juror might have otherwise lowered the credence that she 
gave to the latter details, from, say, 0.9 to 0.1, due to evidence of errors in the 
eyewitness testimony. But once she is aware of the psychological findings on the 
misinformation effect, including about the conditions under which the effect is likely 
to operate, the juror might not lower the credence she gives to the testimony at all, 
leaving it at 0.9, if she remains confident that the conditions under which the 
misinformation effect is likely to operate are not present. She would thereby avoid 
lowering the credence given to the testimony inappropriately. 
 
In sum, then, where jurors are predisposed to inappropriately lower the credence 
given to eyewitness testimony in response to evidence of error, if they are exposed to 
psychological findings on the misinformation effect, this predisposition can be 
changed. The juror who is equipped with information about the misinformation effect 
can prevent herself from making inappropriately low credibility assignments. There is 
consequently good reason for jurors and other participants in the legal system to be 
exposed to the psychological findings other than the reason often provided in the 
existing psychological literature.  
 
9. Fallibility and Unreliability 
The current paper puts pressure on the claim commonly made in the existing literature 
that evidence of memory errors like those involved in the misinformation effect 
establishes that episodic memory systems are unreliable. The psychological findings 
discussed in section 6 and 7 demonstrate that episodic memory systems (i.e. those 
cognitive mechanisms responsible for memories about individual incidents) can 
produce a good supply of true beliefs even though they produce distorted memories. 
If the reliability of a cognitive system is determined by its capacity to produce a high 
ratio of true compared to false beliefs (Goldman 1979), then it is consistent with 
evidence of error like that caused by the misinformation effect that episodic memory 
systems are reliable. The memory systems could provide enough true beliefs about the 
gist of events and about details other than those about which distorted memories have 
been formed to count as reliably producing true beliefs.xviii Psychological findings 
about the misinformation effect establish that episodic memory systems are fallible 
but can also be viewed as undermining the claim that they are unreliable. Therefore, 
the argument of the current paper provides new support for the view that human 
memory systems could be reliable in spite of evidence of errors such as those                                                           
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involved with the misinformation effect (Michaelian 2011, 2013), and certainly more 
reliable than they are often taken to be by psychologists who criticise eyewitness 
testimony (ibid.). Unlike existing arguments, however, it defends the surprising view 
that some eyewitness testimony is assigned less credibility than it should be given its 
reliability, even though people generally find the testimony to be persuasive and 
compelling. 
  
10. Conclusion 
Findings from cognitive science highlighting the susceptibility of human memory to 
the misinformation effect provide reason to worry that jurors, who tend to find 
eyewitness testimony compelling and persuasive, give too much credence to the 
testimony. This point has been widely recognised. However, this paper argues that the 
same psychological findings provide reason to worry that jurors who notice errors in a 
particular piece of eyewitness testimony will inappropriately lower the credence that 
they give to the testimony. They could respond to evidence of errors that occur due to 
the misinformation effect by concluding that the eyewitness who makes the errors 
lacks a supply of true beliefs that they are motivated to supply in their testimony. In 
such cases, jurors can inappropriately lower the credence that they give to some of the 
eyewitness testimony because it is consistent with eyewitnesses making errors in their 
testimony that they have a good supply of true beliefs that they are motivated to 
supply. In fact, evidence of errors in testimony can indicate the ordinary operation of 
cognitive mechanisms that facilitate eyewitnesses having a good supply of true beliefs 
that they can provide through their testimony. 
 
In order to ensure that jurors are not susceptible to this error, they can be educated 
about the cognitive science literature that shows that people can make errors in their 
testimony while nonetheless having a good supply of true beliefs that they are 
motivated to provide. This literature can be used to guide jurors to make informed 
judgements about whether an error is due to a motivation to deceive or a lack of a 
supply of true beliefs, or due to the ordinary operation of human cognitive 
mechanisms that are likely to have facilitated the eyewitness gaining a good supply of 
true beliefs. There are currently debates about how to best achieve the goal of getting 
jurors to respond to evidence of this type, but the current discussion highlights that if 
a successful method is achieved, it will be possible to ensure that jurors do not lower 
the credence that they give to eyewitness testimony inappropriately.  
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                                                          i I focus on eyewitness testimony for the sake of the current discussion, however, many of the 
arguments developed in the current article would also apply to testimony provided by complainants. ii Other distorting factors have also been discussed in the psychology literature, including hindsight 
bias, eyewitness overconfidence, and tendency of eyewitnesses to make a relative judgement when 
identifying suspects in lineups (Wise et al 2009). To the extent that these effects are the result of the 
reconstructive nature of memory, the argument in this paper applies to them too. iii Numerous articles have been written advocating jurors being informed by psychological findings on 
memory biases and responding to the view that eyewitnesses do not need to be informed by the 
findings because, for example, they are already aware of the fallibility of memory. Some examples 
include Stein 2003, Wise et al 2009 and Laney and Loftus 2017.  
iv It is important to note that there is a significant epistemic flaw when incorporation occurs, even if the 
information that is incorporated is accurate: the believer and others have a false idea about the source 
of the memory belief. In some contexts, what people want from a testifier is evidence that they 
specifically witnessed some details of an event. For example, the testimony of one witness might be 
used to corroborate the testimony of another. If the corroborating testimony is the result of 
incorporation, especially the incorporation of information provided by the other witness, then the 
testimony will not provide the independent verification that it is taken to provide. In addition to this, 
sometimes testimony is taken to be especially valuable because it is the result of the personal 
experience of an eyewitness who is taken to be trustworthy. If the testimony is the result of the 
incorporation of information provided by another witness then the testimony will not perform the 
desired result. Each of these considerations suggest that although memory beliefs that involve 
incorporation will often accurately reflect details of remembered events, they will often nonetheless be 
misleading in ways that undermine them as sources of information in a criminal court. For current 
purposes, however, these worries shall be put aside because my positive argument does not depend on 
eyewitness testimony being reliable for the reasons that Michaelian (2013) outlines.  
v In the current discussion it will not be possible to establish the frequency with which these cases 
occur. But even if I do not establish that the cases are common, it is important and noteable that they 
occur, because they can lead to injustice, i.e. incorrect verdicts being made in criminal trials due to 
testimony being given less credence than it deserves. 
vi Whether or not the eyewitness can be displaying intellectual virtue in the formation of the false 
memory will depend upon whether or not one is committed to the view that being virtuous requires 
success in attaining the truth (cf. Zagzebski (1996) and Montmarquet (1987; 1993)). All that is 
important for current purposes, though, is that the eyewitness is not displaying negative intellectual 
character traits that are likely to manifest in the formation of other beliefs, leading to other errors in 
testimony. vii Recent discussions have questioned whether there are stable intellectual character traits that can 
count as intellectual virtues (Alfano 2013). I put this worry aside for the moment. All that is required 
for the current discussion is that it is possible that the eyewitness is behaving, in forming beliefs and 
recalling information about an event, in a way that could fittingly be described as intellectually virtuous 
(or not as intellectually vicious) if it were the expression of stable intellectual character traits. 
viii To be clear, evidence of the misinformation effect is robust, suggesting that it occurs quite 
commonly. However, the claim is that source monitoring is still generally quite reliable, so we can trust 
that a person is often correct about the source of their beliefs. It is therefore incorrect to mistrust them 
about all of the information that they provide.   
ix Stronger and weaker versions of this argument are possible. It could be argued that remembering is at 
least one of the primary function of the cognitive mechanisms that produce memories, but that the 
systems support other functions. Alternatively, it could be argued that remembering is not the primary 
function of the cognitive mechanisms that produce memory (see De Brigard 2014 for a version of the 
latter view).  x Because the episodic constructive simulation hypothesis shares with the mental time travel the claim 
that the function of the cognitive mechanisms underpinning memory is to facilitate prediction of the 
future it finds support in the abovementioned empirical findings supporting the mental time travel view 
that show that there are, e.g., similar cognitive underpinnings for judgements about the past and future 
and correlations between cognitive deficits in remembering the past and predicting the future.  
 27 
                                                                                                                                                               
xi De Brigard’s view can be interpreted as a form of simulationism (Michaelian 2016b) or as an 
alternative to simulationism (Robins 2016). This matter can be put aside for current purposes.   xii Sarah Robins (2016) defends a hybrid account of memory, which integrates elements of 
constructivism with the traditional archival view of memory. Robins argues that it is only possible to 
explain the memory errors studied found in the DRM experiments if one accepts that memory systems 
retain traces of information about past events that are used in the process of constructing 
representations of the past. It is only possible to explain why participants often claim that they had 
studied words that were not on the list studied but were semantically related to the list words by 
supposing that the participants retain traces of information about the experience of reading the list. 
Therefore, remembering involves forming a representation of a past event through a combination of 
retention of information about the event and construction.  
The distinguishing feature of the hybrid account is that it emphasises the importance of the 
retention of information. However, the account allows that construction is a central part of the process 
of memory formation. The view is therefore consistent with the cognitive mechanisms that produce 
memory beliefs performing various functions other than the retention of key information, such as the 
simulation of future events or the formation of plausible hypotheses about what might or might have 
happened.  xiii The information could be provided through instructions by a judge, by expert witnesses, through 
pre-trial training of jurors, or utilizing some other method found to be effective. For example, in the 
UK the Turnbull Guidelines laid down by the Court of Appeal in Turnbull [1977] QB 224 describe 
how when a case depends upon one or more identification of the accused, jurors should be instructed to 
consider ways that the eyewitness might be wrong. My argument provides reason for thinking the 
judge should include information about how the eyewitness might be right in spite of making errors. xiv If representatives from either the defense or prosecution were required to deliver the information 
then one might doubt whether the information would be conveyed in an unbiased manner. However, 
from note 7 it can be seen that there are numerous ways that the relevant information could be 
delivered that would not involve either prosecution or defense representatives to deliver the 
information to jurors. xv By advocating informing of jurors about the misinformation effect I do not deny the importance of 
adopting other strategies to prevent the misinformation effect, such as training police officers to avoid 
suggestive questioning. See, for example, “Code D: The Code of Practice for the Identification of 
Persons by Police Officers”, point 3.3. where it is stipulated that a witness must not be shown images 
of a suspect before a video identification, identification parade or group identification. However, even 
if police officers were able to fully avoid suggestive practices, people would still be susceptible to the 
misinformation effect through social contagion effects, so it would still be of use for jurors to be 
informed about the effect. 
xvi See note iii. 
xvii Note: the juror would be engaging in source monitoring, but they would be monitoring another 
person’s (i.e. the eyewitness’s) memory rather than their own. They would therefore not be susceptible 
to the ordinary errors associated with monitoring of the source of one’s own memory beliefs, such as 
those seemingly responsible for the misinformation effect.   
